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Abstract 
This paper presents an online data-driven 
algorithm to detect false data injection attacks 
towards synchronphasor measurements. The 
proposed algorithm applies density-based local 
outlier factor (LOF) analysis to detect the anomalies 
among the data, which can be described as spatio-
temporal outliers among all the synchrophasor 
measurements from the grid. By leveraging the 
spatio-temporal correlations among multiple time 
instants of synchrophasor measurements, this 
approach could detect false data injection attacks 
which are otherwise not detectable using 
measurements obtained from single snapshot. This 
algorithm requires no prior knowledge on system 
parameters or topology. The computational speed 
shows satisfactory potential for online monitoring 
applications. Case studies on both synthetic and real-
world synchrophasor data verify the effectiveness of 
the proposed algorithm. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The electric power system is evolving towards 
tighter coupling between the information and 
physical systems [1]-[4]. As a prime example of 
sensor and communication deployment, 
synchrophasors provide high-resolution 
measurements with GPS-synchronized time stamps, 
which could benefit system monitoring, control, and 
protection. However, the communication and sensory 
system for synchrophasors also gives rise to threats 
of cyber attacks, which is of increasing concern for 
the grid operators [5]-[10].  
 
As a first step towards preventing the 
synchrophasor system from possible cyber attacks, 
several algorithms for better monitoring have been 
introduced. References [11]-[12] propose 
methodologies to identify and protect key 
measurements in a power grid, in order to prevent the 
system from “unobservable false data injection 
attacks”, which are created by manipulating multiple 
measurements simultaneously while keeping all the 
measurement residuals within normal range. These 
detection methods use measurements obtained from a 
single time instant and deal with false data injection 
attacks for supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems. References [13]-[14] study false 
data injection attacks using synchrophasor 
measurements obtained from multiple time instants, 
and perform detections according to the spatio-
temporal correlations among these measurements. 
However, expensive computations such as nonlinear 
optimizations are involved in [13], which may limit 
the real-time applicability of the algorithm. Prior 
knowledge on system parameters and topology is 
required in [14], which may introduce detection 
errors if inaccurate system information is presented. 
 
In this paper, a purely data-driven approach is 
proposed for online detection of false data injection 
attacks for synchrophsor measurements. An online 
attack detection framework is proposed to detect false 
synchrophasor data that is temporarily injected into a 
limited number of synchrophasors in certain power 
system. The proposed approach leverages the spatio-
temporal correlations among multi-time-instant 
synchrophasor measurements, and detects local 
outliers using a density-based data-mining technique. 
This approach is shown to be capable of detecting 
false data injection attacks in synchrophasor systems 
under both normal and eventful operating conditions, 
without introducing false alarms when system 
physical disturbances are presented. It requires no 
prior knowledge of system parameters or topology, 
and has fast computational speed suitable for online 
applications. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section II provides problem formulation for the false-
data-injection-attack detection of synchrophasor 
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measurements; Section III proposes the online false-
data-injection-attack detection approach for 
synchrophasor systems; Section IV verifies the 
proposed approach through case studies; Section V 
presents concluding remarks to this paper.  
 
2. Problem Formulation 
 
In this section, the detection of false data injection 
attacks for synchrophasor measurements is 
formulated as detection of spatio-temporal outliers 
among time series measured by synchrophasors 
installed at various locations in the same power 
network. 
 
2.1. False Data Injection Attacks 
  
Let m n  matrix M  denote a set of 
synchrophasor measurements collected from n  
synchrophasor channels of the same type (i.e. all of 
them are voltage/current/power channels), within m  
time instants. This measurement matrix can be 
decomposed into the following two matrices: 
 
 M L D    (1) 
 
where L  denotes the matrix whose columns 
represent true synchrophasor measurements without 
false data injections attacks, and D  denotes the 
matrix of false data injections created by attackers. 
Each nonzero entry ijD  represents an injected data 
point to the thj  synchrophasor channel at time instant 
i . 
 
Definition 1: Let im , il , and id  denote the 
thi  
row of matrices M , L , and D , respectively. id  
represents the vector of coordinated false data 
injections at time instant i , and im  represents the 
vector of attacked synchrophasor measurements at 
time instant i . The coordinated attack id  is defined 
to be successful (undetectable) if the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
 
 ( )Ti i im h x r    (2) 
 ( )if r    (3) 
 
where ix  denotes the system state variables 
estimated by certain state estimation algorithm at 
time instant i ; ( )h   denotes the nonlinear 
relationship between system states and measurements 
(i.e., the power flow equations); ir  denotes the 
measurement residuals at time instant i ; ( )f   
denotes the bad data detection criterion based on 
measurement residuals;   denotes the threshold for 
bad data detection. The detection criterion shown in 
(3) is determined by the bad data detection 
mechanism used in certain state estimation program. 
Specifically, the 2 -test and largest normalized 
residual test can be applied on ir  to build (3) and 
identify bad data.  
 
In the above definition, the detection mechanism 
takes advantages of the following information: 1) 
system measurements obtained from single time 
instant; 2) power flow relationship among system 
measurements. Therefore, a coordinated attack id  
can go undetectable if power flow relationship ( )h   is 
satisfied without gross error, for the given 
measurement set Tim  at single time instant i . In the 
following section, a different detection mechanism is 
proposed to deal with false data injection attacks. The 
proposed mechanism leverages the following 
information to detect false data injection attack: 1) 
system synchrophasor measurements obtained from 
multiple time instants; 2) spatio-temporal correlations 
among system synchrophasor measurements. By 
utilizing the above different set of information, the 
proposed approach is able to detect false data 
injection attacks which are undetectable when 
traditional detection mechanism is applied. 
 
2.2. Features of Synchrophasor 
Measurements with/without False Data 
Injection Attacks 
 
In order to analyze measurements obtained at 
multiple time instants, row vectors im , il , and id  are 
inserted back into matrices M , L , and D , 
respectively. Each column of M  represents a 
measurement curve obtained at a synchrophasor 
channel, whose 
thi  entry could be attacked. In this 
paper, we focus on the false data injection attacks 
that could temporarily affect a limited number of 
synchrophasors. This indicates the attack matrix D  
is a sparse matrix with only a few nonzero entries.  
 
It has been demonstrated in [13]-[16] that under 
both normal and eventful operating conditions, 
matrix L  has the property of low rank, indicating 
strong linear correlations among attack-free 
synchrophasor measurements. However, matrix M  
is shown to have a higher rank compared to L , due 
to the nonzero entries of matrix D . Since rank of a 
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matrix represents the number of linearly independent 
columns/rows in the matrix, it can be concluded that 
the number of linearly independent synchrophasor 
measurements is increased due to the presence of 
false data injection attacks. This indicates 
synchrophasor curves under attacks tend to have 
weaker (linear) correlations among each other, 
compared with synchrophasor curves without attacks. 
 
 
Figure 1. Comparison between synchrophasor with 
and without false data injection attack. 
 
In order to further explain the above property, 
Figure 1 shows voltage magnitude curves obtained at 
two synchrophasors within the same local area. The 
system is under eventful condition from 3s to 5s. The 
upper curve contains a false data injection attack at 
around 1s, while the lower curve is free of false data 
injection attack. It can be observed that: 1) the upper 
curve tends to have outlier behavior (weak temporal 
correlation) when false data injection attack is 
presented (around 1s) and when system event is 
presented (from 3s to 5s);  2) during the attack-free 
time period (from 2s to 10s), the two curves obtained 
at different physical locations tend to have similar 
behavior (strong spatial correlation), no matter when 
the system is under normal or eventful operating 
condition; 3) when the system is under attack (around 
1s), the upper curve tends to have outlier behavior 
(weak spatial correlation) compared with the lower 
curve. The above phenomena is caused by the low-
rank property of the attack-free measurement matrix 
L  and the sparse property of the attack matrix D . 
Since components in the same power grid are 
strongly coupled with each other through 
transmission network, the system dynamic 
measurements obtained by different synchrophasors 
within a local area tend to be strongly correlated with 
similar behavior, under both normal and eventful 
operating conditions. However, when a limited 
number of synchrophasors are temporarily attacked 
by the attackers, only the attacked synchrophasors in 
the system would encounter a temporary change in 
their measurements, while measurements obtained by 
the other synchrophasors would reflect normal 
system dynamics. Unlike system events which could 
affect most of the synchrophaor measurements within 
a local area, these false data injection attacks affect 
only a small fraction of all the synchrophasor 
measurements. Therefore, synchrophasor 
measurements under this type of attack would have 
outlier behavior compared with their spatial 
neighborhoods which are free of attack. 
 
The above features of synchrophasors 
with/without false data injection attacks can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Feature 1: Under normal operating conditions, 
synchrophasor measurements without false data 
injection attacks obtained from nearby physical 
locations exhibit strong spatial and temporal 
correlations with each other. 
 
Feature 2: Under eventful operating conditions, 
synchrophasor measurements without false data 
injection attacks obtained from nearby physical 
locations exhibit strong spatial correlations but weak 
temporal correlations with each other. 
 
Feature 3: Under both normal and eventful operating 
conditions, synchrophasor measurements with false 
data injection attacks exhibit weak spatial and 
temporal correlations with synchrophasor 
measurements without false data injection attacks. 
 
The above three features are further demonstrated 
through the simple example shown in Figure 2. Three 
2×8 measurement matrices M(1), M(2), and M(3) are 
sampled from the same set of synchrophasor channels 
at three different time periods. Each matrix contains 8 
synchrophasor curves within 2 consecutive time 
instants. M(1) contains 6 attack-free synchrophasor 
curves and 2 attacked synchrophasor curves obtained 
under normal operating condition. M(2) and M(3) 
contain 8 attack-free synchrophasor curves obtained 
under eventful and normal operating conditions, 
respectively. The Euclidean distance is used to 
quantify the strength of the spatio-temporal 
correlations among these curves. Each synchrophasor 
curve in the three matrices is projected to the 2D 
Euclidean space shown in Figure 2. The x and y 
coordinates of each point are the data values at the 
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first and second time instant of the corresponding 
synchrophasor curve, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2. 2D points representing synchrophasor 
curves under normal/eventful/attacked conditions. 
 
The following observations can be drawn from 
Figure 2: (1) the cluster of eventful synchrophasor 
data (eventful cluster) lies far from the clusters of 
attack-free synchrophasor data under normal 
operating condition (normal cluster), indicating weak 
temporal correlation between the two clusters; (2) all 
the points within the eventful cluster lie close to each 
other, indicating strong spatial correlation among 
points within the eventful cluster; (3) the two points 
representing attacked synchrophasor curves lie far 
from the normal cluster, as well as the majority of 
points in the other 6 points representing the 6 attack-
free synchrophasor curves in M(1), indicating weak 
spatial and temporal similarities with those 
neighboring points. Therefore, synchrophasor 
measurements under false data injection attacks show 
the feature of weak spatio-temporal correlations with 
their neighboring measurements. 
 
2.3. Detection of Spatio-temporal Outliers due 
to False Data Injection Attacks 
 
The above features of synchrophasor 
measurements with/without false data injection 
attacks indicate that under both normal and eventful 
operating conditions, synchrophasor measurements 
with false data injection attacks can be considered as 
spatio-temporal outliers among all the synchrophasor 
measurements of the same type. These outliers can be 
detected using density-based outlier detection 
methods, if the strength of spatio-temporal 
correlations among synchrophasor measurements can 
be measured properly by certain definition of 
“distance”. 
 
For a measurement matrix M obtained within a 
certain period of time, general steps to formulate the 
false-data-injection-attack detection problem are 
presented as follows: 
 
Step 1: Define a proper distance function to quantify 
the similarity between ith and jth column of M. 
 
Step 2: Map each column of M to the subspace S 
where the distance function is defined. Each column 
of M can be represented as a point in the 
corresponding subspace S. 
 
Step 3: Examine the outlier behavior of the points in 
the subspace S, according to the distance function 
defined in Step 1. Points lying far from the majority 
are classified as data with false data injection attacks. 
 
In the above formulation, a data segment that can be 
identified as “spatio-temporal” outlier among its 
neiboring data segments has the the following 
characteristics: it shows certain outlying behavior 
(quantified by the definition of “distance”) along both 
row direction and column direction of the 
measurement matrix M. 
 
3. Online Detection of False Data 
Injection Attacks 
 
In this section, a local outlier factor (LOF) based 
approach is proposed for online detection of false 
data injection attacks towards synchrophasor 
measurements. In [17], we present a similar LOF-
based approach for data quality improvement of 
synchrophasor systems. In this paper, we focus on the 
false data injection attack detection problem for 
synchrophasor measurements, and propose a more 
robust definition of “distance”, which is tailored for 
detecting false data injection attacks caused by false 
data injections in synchrophasor systems. The 
proposed LOF-based false-data-injection-attack 
detection algorithm is described as follows. 
 
3.1. Definition of “Distance” between 
Synchrophasor Measurements 
 
In order to measure the strength of spatio-
temporal correlations among synchrophasor 
measurements, the following definition of “distance” 
is proposed. 
 
Definition 2: Let ( )M k  denote the measurement 
matrix obtained at the 
thk  time interval. Let ( )iM k  
and ( )jM k  denote the 
thi  and thj  columns of 
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measurement matrix ( )M k , that is, ( )iM k  and 
( )jM k  are synchrophasor measurements obtained 
from the thi  and thj  synchrophasor channels at the 
same time interval. The distance ( , )d i j  between 
( )iM k  and ( )jM k  is defined as follows: 
 
( , ) Norm Normi jd i j                         (4) 
1 1
1 1
( )
( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
Norm i
i t k t k
i C i C i
t t
k
t M t M t


  
   
 

 
    (5) 
 
1 ( ( ) )
( ( ))
0 ( ( ) )
i
C i
i
M t C
M t
M t C


 

              (6) 
 
where ( )i t  denotes the standard deviation of the 
columns of ( )iM t , C  denotes the data set of all the 
synchrophasor measurements identified to be clean 
(without false data injection attacks) by the proposed 
algorithm. 
 
Intuitively, Normi  represents the standard 
deviation of measurements obtained from the thi  
synchrophasor channel at current time interval k , 
normalized by the average of all the standard 
deviations of measurements obtained from the same 
channel at previous time intervals, when this channel 
is identified to be clean. This normalized standard 
deviation Normi  serves as an indicator of the strength 
of dynamic behavior of time series ( )iM t . For clean 
measurements without false data injection attacks, 
their normalized standard deviations tend to have 
similar values, indicating strong spatio-temporal 
correlations among them. However, the normalized 
standard deviations of attacked measurements tend to 
have significantly different values compared with 
those of clean measurements, due to their weak 
spatio-temporal correlations. Therefore, the distance 
( , )d i j  can be defined as the absolute difference 
between Normi  and 
Norm
j . Larger distance indicates 
weaker spatio-temporal correlations between ( )iM k  
and ( )jM k . 
 
3.2. LOFs Computation  
 
Based on the above definition of distance, LOFs 
for synchrophasor measurements can be calculated 
through the following procedure. Details of the LOF 
analysis can be found in reference [18]. 
 
3.2.1. Calculation of k-distance(p). Let the 
measurement matrix M  be the matrix consisting of 
synchrophasor measurements, each row of M 
represents a time instant, and each column of M 
represents measurements obtained from a 
synchrophasor channel. Let p , q , o  be some 
objects in M , each object represents a column in 
M . Let k  be a positive integer. Let \{ }q M p  
denotes { : , { }}q q M q p  . The distance between p  
and q , denoted by ( , )d p q , is defined in the previous 
section. 
 
For any positive integer k , the k-distance of 
object p , denoted by k-distance(p), is defined as the 
distance ( , )d p o  between p  and an object o M  
such that: 
 
a) for at least k  objects \{ }o M p  it holds that 
( , ) ( , )d p o d p o  , and 
 
b) for at most 1k   objects \{ }o M p  it holds that 
( , ) ( , )d p o d p o  . 
 
where  
 
The value of k-distance(p) provides a measure on the 
density around the object p . Smaller k-distance(p) 
indicates higher density around p . 
 
3.2.2. Identification of k-distance neighborhood of 
p. Given k-distance(p), the k-distance neighborhood of 
p contains every object whose distance from p  is not 
greater than the k-distance, i.e.,  
 
 
( )( )
{ \{ }| ( , ) ( )}
k distance pN p
q M p d p q k distance p
 
  
  (7) 
 
These objects q  are called the k-nearest 
neighbors of p. 
 
3.2.3. Calculation of reachability distance of object 
p with respect to object o. The reachability distance 
of object p with respect to object o is defined as:  
 
 
( , )
{ ( ), ( , )}
kreach dist p o
max k distance o d p o
 

  (8) 
 
Intuitively, if object p  is far away from object o , 
then the reachability distance between p  and o  is 
simply their actual distance. However, if they are 
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‘sufficiently’ close to each other, the actual distance 
is replaced by the k-distance of o . The reason is that 
in doing so, the statistical fluctuations of ( , )d p o  for 
all the p 's close to o  can be significantly reduced. 
The strength of this smoothing effect can be 
controlled by the parameter k . The higher the value 
of k , the more similar the reachability distances for 
objects within the same neighborhood. 
 
3.2.4. Calculation of local reachability density of p. 
The local reachability density of p is defined as: 
 
 
1
( )
( )
( , )
| ( ) |
MinPts
MinPts
MinPts
o N p
MinPts
lrd p
reach dist p o
N p



 
 
 
 
 
 
           (9) 
 
where ( )( ) ( )k k distance pN p N p . 
 
Intuitively, the local reachability density of an object 
p  is the inverse of the average reachability distance 
based on the MinPts-nearest neighbors of p. It is 
essentially an estimation of the density at point p  by 
analyzing the k-distance of the objects in ( )kN p . 
The local reachability density of p  is just the 
reciprocal of the average distance between p  and the 
objects in its k-neighborhood. 
 
3.2.4. Calculation of LOF of p. The local outlier 
factor of p is defined as: 
 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
| ( ) |
MinPts
MinPts
MinPtso N p
MinPts
MinPts
lrd o
lrd p
LOF p
N p



           (10) 
 
The local outlier factor of object p  captures the 
degree to which p  is a local outlier. It is the average 
of the ratio of the local reachability density of p  and 
those of p 's MinPts-nearest neighbors. It is easy to 
see that the lower p 's local reachability density is, 
and the higher the local reachability densities of p 's 
MinPts-nearest neighbors are, the higher the LOF 
value of p is. 
 
After obtaining LOFs for all the synchrophasor 
channels, each LOF is compared with a pre-defined 
threshold to detect false data injection attacks. The 
LOF threshold is a system-dependent value and can 
be determined through offline training, using 
historical data obtained from the same system. 
Synchrophasor channels with LOFs exceeding the 
threshold can be detected as attacked channels. 
Figure 2 shows the implementation flowchart for the 
proposed LOF-based false-data-injection-attack 
detection approach. 
 
 
Figure 3. Flowchart of the proposed false-data-
injection-attack detection approach. 
 
4. Case Studies 
 
In this section, the proposed false-data-injection-
attack detection approach is tested using both 
synthetic and practical synchrophasor data. In order 
to demonstrate the proposed approach can detect 
false data injection attack under eventful operating 
condition, without introducing false alarms by system 
physical events, a system event is presented in each 
of the test cases. In all the following test cases, a 
unique set of algorithm parameters are used: moving 
data window length = 20 data points; LOF threshold 
= 10; Number of neighboring data for LOF algorithm 
= 0.5   number of synchrophasor curves. The setting 
of the algorithm parameters can be optimized through 
offline training using historical synchrophasor 
measurements obtained in the same power grid. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that, the physical events 
chosen for the following case studies are fast 
transient events with similar temporal outlying 
behavior compared to the false data injection attacks. 
Both the events and the attacks show some sudden 
changes in the eventful/attacked synchrophasor 
curve. This similarity could potentially cause false 
alarms for false-data-attack detection algorithms. For 
slower events such as variation of loading conditions, 
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less false alarms would be introduced, since these 
slow events do not have very similar temporal 
outlying behavior compared to false data injection 
attacks. 
 
4.1. Case Study with Synthetic Data 
 
The synthetic synchrophasor measurements are 
generated using simulation results obtained from a 
standard IEEE-14 bus system in Matlab PSAT 
toolbox [19]. In order to verify the performance of 
the proposed algorithm under eventful operating 
condition, a three-phase line-to-ground fault is 
applied to the system. All the simulation results are 
sampled at the rate of 50Hz to build the synthetic 
synchrophasor data. The synthetic data set has 14 
synchrophasor curves for voltage magnitudes, where 
synchrophasor channels No. 1, 3, and 9 contain 
constant false data injections (lasting from 6s to 6.4s) 
[13]-[14]. The length of each injected data segment is 
0.4s. Figure 3 shows the data curves with false data 
injection attacks. 
 
 
Figure 4. Synthetic synchrophasor measurements 
with false data injection attacks. 
 
Figure 4 shows the LOF values of the 
synchrophasor measurements under physical event or 
false data injection attack. It can be seen that under 
physical events, LOFs of all the measurements lie far 
below the threshold value, while under false data 
injection attacks, LOFs of the attacked measurements 
(synchrophasor channel No. 1, 3, and 9) exceed the 
threshold value. This verifies the effectiveness of the 
proposed algorithm in accurately detecting false data 
injection attacks without creating false alarms due to 
physical system events. 
 
 
Figure 5. LOF values of synthetic synchrophasor 
channels when system physical event (right) or false 
data injection attack (left) is presented. 
 
The detection results of false data injection 
attacks for synthetic synchrophasor data are shown in 
Table 1. It can be seen that all the attacked 
synchrophasor channels (No. 1, 3, and 9) are 
successfully detected, and no false alarms are created 
by system events. The time delay of the starting and 
ending time instants of the false data injection attacks 
is less than 0.38s. The time delay is mainly caused by 
the time window length determined in the algorithm. 
Larger time window may result in more time delay 
for the detection. The average computation time for 
the proposed algorithm over one time window is 
0.0130s. The detection delay and computation time of 
the proposed approach are insignificant compared 
with the latency requirements for online quasi-
steady-state applications, ranging from 1 seconds to 5 
seconds [20]. The performance of the proposed 
approach is satisfactory for online applications. 
 
Table 1. Detection results for synthetic 
synchrophasor data with false data injection attack 
Index of 
Synchrophasor 
with Cyber 
Attack 
Starting Time 
of Attacked 
Segment 
Ending Time of 
Attacked 
Segment 
1 
6.20s 
(LOF = 101.5) 
6.78s 
(LOF = 33.4) 
3 
6.32s 
(LOF = 52.3) 
6.78s 
(LOF = 26.3) 
9 
6.32s 
(LOF = 73.9) 
6.78s 
(LOF = 36.6) 
 
4.2. Case Study with Actual PMU Data 
 
The proposed approach is also tested using real 
synchrophasor measurements obtained in a practical 
power grid during a line-tripping fault. The sampling 
rate of the synchrophasor data is 100Hz. Since we do 
not have access to some cyber compromised actual 
PMU data, in order to test the performance under 
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false data injection attacks, we added constant data 
injections to PMU No. 14, 18, 24, and 37 (lasting 
from 1.0s to 1.2s). The length of each injected data 
segment is 0.2s. Figure 5 shows the data curves with 
false data injection attacks. 
 
 
Figure 6. Practical synchrophasor measurements with 
false data injection attacks. 
 
Figure 6 shows the LOF values of the 
synchrophasor measurements under physical event 
and false data injection attack. It can be seen that 
under physical events, LOFs of all the measurements 
lie far below the threshold value, while under false 
data injection attacks, LOFs of the attacked 
measurements (synchrophasor channel No. 14, 18, 
24, and 37) exceed the threshold value. This verifies 
the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in 
accurately detecting false data injection attacks 
without creating false alarms due to physical system 
events. 
 
 
Figure 7. LOF values of practical synchrophasor 
channels when system physical event (right) or false 
data injection attack (left) is presented. 
 
The detection results of false data injection attacks 
for practical synchrophasor data are shown in Table 
2. It can be seen that all the attacked synchrophasor 
channels (No. 14, 18, 24, and 37) are successfully 
detected, and no false alarms are created by system 
events. The time delay of the starting and ending time 
instants of the false data injection attacks is less than 
0.19s. The time delay is mainly caused by the time 
window length determined in the algorithm. Larger 
time window may result in more time delay for the 
detection. The average computation time for the 
proposed algorithm over one time window is 0.040s. 
The detection delay and computation time of the 
proposed approach are insignificant compared with 
the latency requirements for online quasi-steady-state 
applications, ranging from 1 seconds to 5 seconds 
[20]. The performance of the proposed approach is 
satisfactory for online applications. Although the 
computation time of the proposed algorithm would 
grow if more synchrophasor curves are available in 
the system, the growth in computation time would be 
limited since there is no complicated computation, 
such as nonlinear optimization or matrix inversion, 
involved in the proposed approach. Moreover, in 
order to detect false data injection attacks in large-
scale power systems with a large number of 
synchrophasors, this approach can be easily applied 
in a decentralized way by performing false-data-
injection-attack detection at each of the local phasor 
data concentrators (PDC), using synchrophasor data 
obtained at the corresponding local regions. 
 
Table 2. Detection results for practical synchrophasor 
data with false data injection attack 
Index of 
Synchrophasor 
with Cyber 
Attack 
Starting Time 
of Attacked 
Segment 
Ending Time of 
Attacked 
Segment 
14 
1.16s 
(LOF = 141.9) 
1.39s 
(LOF = 133.4) 
18 
1.16s 
 (LOF = 99.5) 
1.39s 
 (LOF = 93.6) 
24 
1.16s 
(LOF = 60.4) 
1.39s 
(LOF = 55.9) 
37 
1.16s 
 (LOF = 332.2) 
1.39s  
(LOF = 311.8) 
 
In order to study the impact of time delay on the 
performance of the proposed algorithm, Figure 7 
shows the receiver operator characteristic (ROC) 
curves when different time window lengths are used. 
It can be seen from Figure 7 that: a) the proposed 
approach has higher detection accuracy when the 
time window length is set to be 0.2s or 0.25s; b) 
when the time window length is set at a lower value 
(0.15s), the detection accuracy tends to be lower and 
false alarms would happen; c) when the time window 
length is increased form 0.2s to 0.25s, the detection 
accuracy of the proposed algorithm is not improved 
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significantly. Since time window length is also 
closely related to the detection delay of the algorithm, 
it is desirable to consider both detection accuracy and 
detection delay when determining the time window 
length for the algorithm. 
 
 
Figure 8. ROC curves for test case with practical 
synchrophasor measurements when different time 
window lengths are used. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
This paper proposes an online data-driven algorithm 
to detect false data injection attacks against 
synchronphasor measurements. This approach 
leverages the unique spatio-temporal correlation 
signatures among synchrophasor measurements over 
a moving window of time. The change of the 
signature indicates the presence of possible false data 
injection attacks. The detection is shown to be 
effective under both normal and fault-on conditions. 
It is purely data-driven algorithm without involving 
prior knowledge on parameters or topology of the 
power grid, which avoids the impact of inaccurate 
system information on the detection results. The 
effectiveness of the proposed approach is verified 
through case studies using both synthetic and 
practical data sets.  
 
The proposed LOF-based framework can also be 
applied to detecting various low-quality 
synchrophasor measurements. Through proposing 
different ‘distance functions’ for different types of 
data quality problems, and introducing multiple 
‘distance functions’ into the algorithm, the spatio-
temporal features of each type of data quality 
problem can be quantified differently. This could 
improve the detection sensitivity for different types 
of problems. 
 
While in this work we focus on attacks that only 
affect a limited number of synchrophasors in a 
temporary way, our future work will investigate the 
possibility of a more coordinated attack. The cross-
domain correlation among different sets of data (e.g., 
SCADA and synchrophasors) would offer new 
possibilities to detect such coordinated attacks. We 
would also investigate more robust definitions of 
distances for various types of data attacks. Last but 
not least, we would also investigate different 
categories of cyber attacks such as spoofing of GPS 
clocks. 
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